App analysis · 19.10.2026
TrackerControl
net.kollnig.missioncontrol.fdroid · version 2026.08.05-fdroid
In short
SDKs found: 0. Companies: 0, of which outside the EEA — 0. Sensitive permissions: 2 — all code inside the app, including embedded SDKs, can use them.
Sensitive permissions (2)
- list of all installed apps —
android.permission.QUERY_ALL_PACKAGES - phone data (carrier, call state) —
android.permission.READ_PHONE_STATE
All manifest permissions (15)
android.permission.ACCESS_LOCAL_NETWORKandroid.permission.ACCESS_NETWORK_STATEandroid.permission.ACCESS_WIFI_STATEandroid.permission.FOREGROUND_SERVICEandroid.permission.FOREGROUND_SERVICE_SPECIAL_USEandroid.permission.INTERNETandroid.permission.POST_NOTIFICATIONSandroid.permission.QUERY_ALL_PACKAGESandroid.permission.READ_PHONE_STATEandroid.permission.RECEIVE_BOOT_COMPLETEDandroid.permission.REQUEST_IGNORE_BATTERY_OPTIMIZATIONSandroid.permission.VIBRATEandroid.permission.WAKE_LOCKnet.kollnig.missioncontrol.fdroid.DYNAMIC_RECEIVER_NOT_EXPORTED_PERMISSIONnet.kollnig.missioncontrol.fdroid.permission.ADMIN
Limits of the analysis
The analysis shows code inside the app file, not data transfers: an SDK being present means a transfer is possible, not that it happens. The country is where the company owning the SDK is registered, not where its servers are. Some code may have been renamed at build time, so the SDK list is a lower bound.
The legal assessment is made by the competent supervisory authority.
Evidence
net.kollnig.missioncontrol.fdroid · version 2026.08.05-fdroid (code 2026080501)f221b02f09aab1f9630ae7406e91e260d92f377a4bb4e0204e17542741263d42d54de792e8b68cb22d3dad7b5c9f37316489724ce6fb21572463ee5d4e074f0113c27d15ac2eThe same file (same SHA-256) with the same library version gives the same result — check it on the APK check page. Licence CC BY 4.0, source — gdpru.eu; report errors to contact@gdpru.eu.